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ABSTRACT—Patent law has long harbored the concept of “inventing 
around,” under which competitors to a patent holder may be expected, and 
even encouraged, to design their technologies so as to skirt the boundaries 
defined by patent claims. It has become increasingly clear that, for better or 
for worse, copyright also fosters inventing around. Copyright is not based 
on written claims, but because copyright links exclusive rights to 
technological actions such as reproduction, distribution, or transmission, 
the language of the copyright statute, and judicial readings of the statute, 
create boundaries around which potential infringers may technologically 
navigate. For example, the Aereo case recently decided by the Supreme 
Court involves technology that was explicitly designed to conform to 
noninfringing definitions of private transmission found in previous court 
decisions. But in copyright, unlike patent, there has been little analysis of 
the tendency to foster alternative technological development. This Essay 
draws upon previous analyses of inventing around in patent law to assess 
the benefits and detriments of inventing around in copyright. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Patent law has long harbored the concept of “inventing around,” under 
which competitors to a patent holder may be expected, and even 
encouraged, to design their technologies so as to skirt the boundaries 
defined by patent claims. It has become increasingly clear that, for better or 
for worse, copyright also fosters inventing around. In each area, there is a 
pattern of follow-on innovators designing new technology so as to avoid 
the infringement liability that might accrue under the existing intellectual 
property rights. However, inventing around a patent involves skirting the 
definition of the protected invention, whereas inventing around a copyright 
involves skirting terminology in the copyright statute. Unlike patent, 
copyright is not based on written claims, and so copyright inventing around 
does not involve navigating the boundaries of a particular intellectual 
property holder’s right. Rather, because copyright links exclusive rights to 
technological actions such as reproduction, distribution, or transmission, 
the language of the copyright statute and judicial readings of the statute 
create boundaries around which potential infringers may technologically 
navigate. 
In this Essay, I discuss the phenomenon of inventing around in 
copyright and how it might be informed by the better-understood 
phenomenon of inventing around in patent law. I first describe prominent 
examples of copyright inventing around observed in cases such as A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster and American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo. I then 
turn to an examination of the literature on inventing around in patent, 
highlighting several insights that may be useful in understanding what 
occurred in cases such as Napster and Aereo. Finally, I explore how the 
motivations behind patent and copyright inventing-around doctrines differ 
in significant ways that might cause copyright inventing around to depart 
from the analysis found in the patent literature. Recognizing the somewhat 
hidden hand of copyright in fostering or shaping certain technological 
progress, I argue that the merits and implications of copyright inventing 
around deserve closer attention from the courts and Congress. 
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I. COPYRIGHT AND TECHNICAL DESIGN 
Copyright law by its nature encourages technological design choices 
that take advantage of definitional loopholes in the rights granted under the 
copyright statute. Several examples of this effect can readily be identified 
in the recent history surrounding U.S. copyright law. For example, thirteen 
years ago the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held the 
purveyors of the Napster peer-to-peer file sharing system to be 
contributorily and vicariously liable for copyright infringement.1 This 
holding was based largely on the particular architecture of the Napster 
system.2 Peer-to-peer systems are denominated as such because the 
individual computing devices participating in the system communicate 
directly with one another, rather than communicating through a central hub. 
However, the Napster system maintained a centralized database listing files 
resident on the system, which users could access to determine which files 
they wished to share or acquire. Because of the presence of this centralized 
feature, the court concluded that Napster had the ability to monitor both 
who was using its system and what was accessible by means of the system.3 
Such knowledge is a key component of secondary copyright liability.4 
Thus, the architecture of the Napster technology led inevitably to the 
finding of infringement. 
Not surprisingly, the centralized features of the Napster system, on 
which secondary liability was premised, were absent from the next 
generation of peer-to-peer file sharing software.5 Subsequent systems such 
as Grokster and KaZaA avoided any centralized monitoring or control 
point, adopting more fully distributed architectures that dispersed indexing 
as well as content and exchange among multiple network nodes.6 This 
allowed the purveyors of the software to assert quite truthfully that they 
had no means of knowing who or what was on their system at any given 
time, and having no ability to monitor or control the use of the system, 
could not be secondarily liable for infringing activity. Indeed, the U.S. 
Supreme Court acknowledged the success of this strategy by inventing and 
imposing on Grokster a new form of secondary liability—inducement—
which required no such knowledge or control, and so required no central 
feature to trigger liability.7 
 
1 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001). 
2 See id. at 1020, 1024. 
3 Id. at 1021–24. 
4 Id. at 1020. 
5 REBECCA GIBLIN, CODE WARS: 10 YEARS OF P2P SOFTWARE LITIGATION 29–33 (2011). 
6 Id. at 73–74; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of 
Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 519 (2003). 
7 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005). 
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Grokster and KaZaA intentionally attempted to design around the 
contours of technological liability as mapped out by the Ninth Circuit in the 
Napster decision. But this type of inventing around copyright is by no 
means unusual. It appears in the more recent American Broadcasting Cos. 
v. Aereo, Inc. controversy recently decided by the Supreme Court.8 The 
Aereo storage and transmission technology at issue in the case provided 
subscribers with streaming Internet retransmission of over-the-air broadcast 
television programming. The system was explicitly designed to conform to 
definitions of permissible activity articulated in previous copyright cases.9 
Specifically, the copyright statute grants copyright holders an exclusive 
right of public performance for their works. Previous court decisions had 
held that an individually stored recording of a broadcast television show, 
accessed by a particular user at that user’s discretion, did not constitute a 
public performance of the show, but was rather a private performance 
outside the ambit of the copyright holder’s exclusive right.10 
Aereo built its service around technology meeting this definition of 
noninfringing private transmission.11 The Aereo system is comprised of 
thousands of tiny antennae that receive broadcast programming.12 Each 
antenna is assigned to an individual subscriber upon the subscriber 
requesting to watch a certain show. Aereo records and stores the show on a 
folder on Aereo’s servers—accessible only by that subscriber—and then 
streams the recorded show over the Internet to the subscriber.13 Thus, every 
step of the Aereo transmission was designed to permit only private 
performances, not public performances as defined by the courts, so as to 
skirt the rights of the copyright holder as articulated in previous copyright 
decisions. 
A majority of the Second Circuit reviewing panel agreed that Aereo’s 
setup provided a private transmission, effectively skirting the statutory 
exclusive right for public performances.14 In dissent, Judge Chin asserted 
with some apparent outrage that the Aereo design was an “over-
engineered,” “Rube Goldberg-like” contraption, designed solely to avoid 
 
8 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
9 See Brian Fung, Aereo: Yes We’re a Rube Goldberg Device. And We’re Proud of It., WASH. 
POST, March 27, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/03/27/aereo-yes-
were-a-rube-goldberg-device-and-were-proud-of-it [http://perma.cc/5KS2-W8YG]. 
10 Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139 (2d Cir. 2008). 
11 Cecilia Kang & Robert Barnes, Supreme Court to Decide on Aereo, Obscure Start-up that Could 
Reshape TV Industry, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
technology/2014/04/21/50bbd1e8-c59d-11e3-9f37-7ce307c56815_story.html [http://perma.cc/T3W7-
4EAW]. 
12 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503. 
13 Id. 
14 WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, 712 F.3d 676, 696 (2d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom., Am. Broad. Cos. v. 
Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498. 
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the letter of the copyright statute.15 Judge Chin observed that there was no 
particular reason to design the system with tiny individual receiving 
antennae except as a dodge around the public performance right; absent the 
previous definition of public performances, it might well have been more 
efficient to design a service for streaming and recording broadcast with a 
single receiving antenna.16 The Supreme Court largely agreed, rejecting 
Aereo’s “technological differences” as immaterial to the question of public 
performance.17 
II. INVENTING AROUND TEXTS 
From the standpoint of intellectual property policy, the type of 
technical end-run seen in Aereo is hauntingly familiar. A different branch 
of intellectual property law—patent law—has long recognized the policy 
justification of inventing around, which is sometimes touted as one of the 
benefits of the patent system. Unlike copyright, the boundaries of the patent 
holder’s rights are defined by textual claims in the patent document; 
infringement occurs in cases of unauthorized making, using, selling, 
offering for sale, or importing technology that falls within the claims.18 
Competitors to the patent holder may therefore invest in developing 
substitutes that fall outside the claims, which is to say in inventing around 
the obstacle of the patent right. Patents are intended to encourage 
innovation, and are usually assumed to do so via the reward of exclusive 
rights in a meritorious invention, but the inventing around rationale 
suggests that patents may also somewhat perversely spur innovation as 
others seek permissible alternatives to the legally encumbered technology. 
Thus, in the patent context, contrary to Judge Chin’s views in 
copyright, a technological design that intentionally skirts the intellectual 
property holder’s rights may be viewed as a proper or desirable response to 
the presence of exclusivity. The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit in particular has touted inventing around as a spur to 
innovation, suggesting that rights which may be viewed as impediments to 
competitors actually force competitors to become more innovative in the 
course of avoiding infringement.19 Patent law’s doctrine of equivalents 
prevents trivial or obvious inventing around patent claims: under this 
doctrine, known substitutes or insubstantial variations on the claimed 
 
15 Id. at 697 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
16 Id. 
17 Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2508. 
18 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
19 See, e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See 
generally Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
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invention still fall within the ambit of the patent holder’s rights.20 Thus, in 
order to avoid infringement, inventing around patent claims will tend to 
require a substantial degree of innovation and the investment that goes 
along with this requirement.21 
Inventing around in patent law is largely a result of textual formalism. 
Because the scope of patent rights is defined by written claims, determining 
the scope of the claims requires interpretation.22 The settled first step in 
patent claim construction is deciding the literal meaning of the claims—
that is, assigning discrete denotations to words or phrases within the text.23 
This defines a conceptual boundary that determines not only what 
technology is covered by the patent, but also what technology is not 
covered by the patent. Technologies that lack each of the elements of the 
claims, or arrange components in some substantially different way, fall 
outside the formal denotation of the claims and so are not considered 
infringing. Competitors to the patent holder are considered perfectly 
justified in developing or adopting alternatives that lie outside the 
interpretive boundaries of the claims. 
By contrast, in copyright, it is either the statute itself or a particular 
doctrine, such as contributory infringement, rather than textual claims that 
lead to inventing around. Of course, in some cases, the patent statute may 
lend itself to inventing around. For example, a line of cases culminating in 
the current Supreme Court review of Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. 
Limelight Networks, Inc.24 holds that for a process patent to be directly 
infringed under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), a single entity must perform or direct 
all the steps of the claimed process.25 This might create an incentive for a 
potential infringer to innovate in such a way as to decouple steps in the 
process, so that different actors may perform different steps.26 However, for 
the most part, this infringement loophole is likely to prompt business or 
logistical innovation rather than technical innovation. The patent statute 
generally sets broad criteria for patentability, which are then realized in 
specific patent claims, pushing the practice of inventing around to the level 
of the patent text, rather than to the level of the patent statute’s text. 
 
20 London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
21 Paul N. Katz, The Doctrine of Equivalents and Its Impact on “Designing Around,” 4 FED. CIR. 
B.J. 315, 322–23 (1994). 
22 See Dan L. Burk, Dynamic Claim Interpretation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE 
COMMON LAW 107, 107–08 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (discussing formalism in claims 
interpretation). 
23 See Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 401 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (explaining claims 
interpretation). 
24 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). 
25 Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117–18 (2014). 
26 Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 260 (2005). 
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Unlike the patent statute, the copyright statute entails several features 
that foster statutory inventing around. First, copyright has evolved to place 
exclusive rights at the level of activities such as reproduction and 
distribution of copies, or transmission of performances, which are largely 
technological activities.27 Whereas patent law is meant to promote 
technological discovery and progress, copyright was classically intended as 
a response to technological discoveries or progress that made it easier for 
third parties to copy and benefit from the creative works of others. As new 
technology, such as the printing press, lowered the cost and speed of 
copying, prices fell, availability of content rose, and natural copy control 
by means of physical impediments deteriorated.28 Legal exclusivity 
replaced some of the control that was lost due to more effective copying 
technology. As increasingly effective copying technology was developed 
and disseminated—such as offset lithography, xerography, and 
digitization—legal exclusivity was called upon to fill a greater and greater 
gap between the initial cost of creation and the cost of subsequent 
dissemination.29 
Second, the copyright statute has been the site of repeated, ongoing, 
and frequent amendment to address technologically specific activities. This 
has largely been the result of legislative lobbying by established industries 
that are invested in a particular technology or associated business model.30 
Such amendments divide rights and responsibilities among stakeholders, 
extend the exclusive rights granted by the statute, and sometimes create 
exceptions to or exemptions from existing exclusive rights. The 
amendments are typically couched in terms of the most contemporary 
technological threat to the hegemony of copyright holders. Radio, 
broadcast television, xerography, cable, digital transmission, and other 
communication technologies have all left their mark on the statute as 
Congress has responded to the demands of copyright holders, resulting in 
the cumulative, technologically defined amendment of the statute over 
time.31 
III. LEGAL EVASION AND TECHNICAL AVOISION 
Such amendments provide fertile ground for inventing around, 
although they are themselves the product of a separate phenomenon. 
 
27 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (listing the exclusive rights in copyright). 
28 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 31 
(rev. ed. 2003). 
29 See id. at 21. 
30 JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 22–24 (2001). 
31 See generally Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 
275 (1989) (detailing successive legislative changes to the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts in response to 
communication technologies). 
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Copyright historians, such as Jessica Litman, have noted that 
communication technologies often initially thrive outside of the formal 
boundaries of copyright.32 Such technologies begin and develop as media 
not contemplated or controlled by the copyright statute, but are eventually 
encompassed by amendments to the statute, producing an ever-increasing 
statutory ambit of exclusivity. For example, the copyright status of 
photography was initially uncertain, because it was unclear that the images 
captured on photographic plates were works of authorship rather than facts 
about the state of the world.33 Later on, motion pictures were registered 
with the Copyright Office as collections of still photographs until Congress 
added movies to the statute in 1912.34 Sound recordings similarly began as 
a medium outside of copyright—the Supreme Court explicitly held that 
early sound recordings were mechanical devices and not copies for 
purposes of the statute—until Congress subsequently added them to the 
statute as a new class of fixed works dubbed “phonorecords.”35 
Such historical examples are largely concerned with technologies that 
serendipitously grew beyond copyright’s boundaries. Their history might 
be (and sometimes has been) taken as evidence that new technologies do 
better outside of copyright—that only the technological seeds scattered 
outside of copyright’s shadow receive enough sun and nourishment to 
flourish.36 But here we are concerned with a related, though distinctly 
different phenomenon, in which innovators deliberately take the measure of 
copyright’s zone of exclusivity and then purposely design new technologies 
that skirt that zone. 
It might also be observed that versions of the inventing around effect 
are not limited to intellectual property rights, but might be seen generally in 
some form where human motivations and governmental regulation 
intersect. No doubt securities regulation leads to innovative derivative 
structuring intended to skirt the regulation, building codes lead to 
innovative architectural and construction practices intended to skirt the 
regulation, tax regulation leads to development of innovative tax shelters, 
and so on. However, these are primarily unintended consequences and 
often constitute unwanted or even malicious exploitation of gaps in the law. 
The loopholes are often closed and the practice is stamped out on the next 
round of regulation. 
 
32 See LITMAN, supra note 30, at 106–07. 
33 See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (holding photographs to 
be copyrightable works of authorship). 
34 LITMAN, supra note 30, at 40–41. 
35 Id. at 39; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “phonorecords”). 
36 See LITMAN, supra note 30, at 106–07. 
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Tim Wu has previously explored this aspect of technological design 
based on legal loopholes.37 Wu argues that the response to legal constraints 
will take the form of least cost avoidance: if compliance with law is the 
least costly alternative, then compliance can be expected to occur.38 But 
depending on relative cost, reactions to law may take other forms, such as 
litigating or lobbying to change law, or restructuring of business plans to 
exploit legal loopholes.39 This latter effect is a common occurrence in 
taxation or regulatory compliance, which Leo Katz dubbed “avoision,” a 
portmanteau of “avoidance” and “evasion.”40 Taking a page from Larry 
Lessig’s analysis of law and technology,41 Wu observes that if formal law 
and technological constraints are at some level interchangeable, then 
avoision may occur by restructuring technology rather than restructuring 
behavior if such restructuring is less costly than compliance.42 
But this picture, while useful, may be incomplete. Technological 
avoidance may not necessarily be legal evasion, at least not in the sense 
identified by Professor Wu. In the Federal Circuit’s view of patent 
inventing around, such activity does not constitute avoision, at least not as 
identified by Wu. To be certain, competitors to a patent holder who invent 
around are avoiding the alternative of infringement, and they will 
presumably do so only if inventing around is cheaper than the alternatives 
of being penalized for infringing or licensing. But avoiding the boundaries 
of patent claims is not the same as avoiding the intent of the patent law. To 
the contrary, inventing around patent claims is instead considered a 
legitimate and desired response to the law; inventing around is, if not the 
intended response to patent exclusivity, at least an intended response to 
patent exclusivity. 
IV. RACING AND INVENTING AROUND 
However established inventing around may be in patent law, in both of 
the copyright examples I have mentioned—Grokster and the more recent 
Aereo decision—the Supreme Court went out of its way to negate the 
strategy of designing around. The question then may be how desirable 
inventing around is as a policy matter and whether that policy applies only 
to patents. The positive view of patent inventing around casts patent claims 
as a kind of innovation obstacle course, intended to build fitness and 
 
37 See generally Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679 (2003). 
38 Id. at 688–89. 
39 Id. at 692–93. 
40 LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE 
LAW 17–30 (1996). 
41 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). 
42 Wu, supra note 37, at 708. 
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character in the competitors who are forced to navigate its hurdles. But this 
position on inventing around is itself controversial. Many commentators 
have been less enthusiastic about the concept, observing that inventing 
around patent rights may well lead to inefficient and duplicative invention 
by prompting development of unneeded or second-best alternatives to 
patented technologies.43 
As Michael Abramowicz observed, inventing around is closely related 
to patent racing and the question of rent dissipation.44 Rent dissipation 
occurs when parties competing for the reward of the patent exhaust all or 
part of the value of the patent in expenditures to obtain it. Inventing around 
may be regarded as a sort of patent race in which one of the parties has 
already won: rather than two innovators seeking to be the first to claim a 
patent, in inventing around the late-coming competitor is left to develop a 
technological alternative to the patent that has been granted. Mark Lemley 
has recently argued that racing avoids the potential monopoly stagnation of 
placing a broad swath of innovation into the hands of a single patent 
owner.45 Thus, racing or inventing around provides alternatives to the 
patented technology, thereby potentially fostering competition, which is in 
and of itself valuable. But the orthodox view of such races has been that 
both the private and social value of the patent might be overshadowed by 
expenditures to capture legal exclusivity.46 
In this regard it is important to note that not only patent law—and 
perhaps copyright law—but also the separate intellectual property area of 
trade secrecy encourages a type of inventing around. The law of trade 
secrecy, which penalizes misappropriation of confidential business 
information, allows certain permissible activities that are considered proper 
means to obtain the secret: reverse engineering or independent recreation of 
proprietary information.47 These legitimate methods for capturing trade 
secrets serve to channel competitive activity away from wasteful 
investments in industrial espionage or employee enticement and instead 
prompt investment in productive activity that builds the technical 
 
43 F. M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 379–99 (3d ed. 1990); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1869 (1984); Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 
44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 455 (1969). 
44 Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 185 (2003). 
45 Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 754 (2012); see also 
Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District: Observations on the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 
78 VA. L. REV. 359 passim (1992) (cautioning that preventing rent dissipation could curb beneficial 
competition). 
46 See Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 
318 (1992). 
47 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995). 
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knowledge of the competitor.48 The permissible modes of obtaining 
otherwise confidential information also place a natural cap on the cost of 
licensing a trade secret. Trade secret licenses are always bargains for 
disclosure, and because reverse engineering or independent creation are 
available as alternatives to disclosure, the cost of disclosure will rationally 
be set at something a bit less than the cost of the alternatives.49 
This view of trade secrecy suggests a similar construction of patent 
inventing around. Much as in trade secrecy, patent inventing around is 
unlikely to occur unless the patent holder and the competitor have very 
different estimations of the cost of developing an alternative technology.50 
If the valuations of inventing around costs are similar, the parties are likely 
to be able to negotiate a royalty for use of the patented technology that will 
be lower than the cost of inventing around: the competitor will not wish to 
incur the inventing around cost if the royalty is cheaper, and the patent 
holder will set the royalty low enough to avoid inducing the competitor to 
invent around. Thus, when it occurs, inventing around in some sense 
represents a bargaining breakdown.51 
Consequently, the positive view of inventing around requires a tricky 
allocation of economic surplus, as Suzanne Scotchmer famously observed, 
between the patent holder and the competitor.52 Sufficient surplus from the 
social value of the follow-on innovation must be allocated to the initial 
innovator who obtains the patent; otherwise the patent holder may not be 
properly motivated to invest in the patented item. At the same time, enough 
surplus must be allocated to the follow-on competitor to ensure the 
necessary investment in inventing around, which private licensing may not 
accomplish. This suggests that incentives for patent inventing around may 
be deficient; just as inventing around may be socially wasteful if the private 
value to the competitor exceeds the social benefit of having a new 
alternative technology, so failure to invent around may be socially wasteful 
where the private value of the license to the patent owner exceeds the social 
benefit of having the new technology. 
 
48 David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 69 
(1991). 
49 Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 279 
(1977). 
50 Martin J. Adelman, The Supreme Court, Market Structure, and Innovation: Chakrabarty, Rohm 
and Haas, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 457, 464 (1982). 
51 Id. 
52 Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent 
Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 34 (1991). 
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V. SECONDARY RACING 
In copyright, unlike patent, there has been little analysis of the 
tendency to foster alternative technological development. Professor 
Abramowicz has analyzed copyright’s adaptive right in terms of rent 
dissipation, much as he has examined inventing around in the patent 
context.53 But the context of that analysis concerns not inventing around 
copyright doctrine, but what one might call “creating around” the protected 
work itself: an attempt to develop a substitute for the copyrighted work.54 
Copyright law’s doctrines of substantial similarity and derivative works 
police such creations. As in the case of patent law’s doctrine of equivalents, 
copyright mimicry that skirts too close to the rights in the protected work 
will be penalized as an unauthorized adaptation or as substantially 
reproducing the work, unless excused by one of the many statutory 
privileges and exemptions that define the boundaries of the exclusive rights 
in the work.55 
Such creating around the work is somewhat analogous to patent 
inventing around in that it attempts to develop a substitute for the particular 
subject of exclusivity; however, as described above, it differs from patent 
inventing around in that it does not involve skirting the formal 
interpretation of a legal text.56 Most significantly, it is not the situs for 
technological avoision of the kind we saw in the cases of Grokster and 
Aereo. The Grokster and Aereo systems are not alternatives or substitutes 
for copyrighted works; they are alternatives or substitutes for, respectively, 
compact discs and cable transmission—that is, for preexisting methods of 
delivering copyrighted works. The goal of a Grokster or Aereo designer is 
not to circumvent a particular copyright, but rather to avoid liability for 
provision of a class of copyrighted content. Typically, the copyright holder 
involved in creating around will be fostering or developing content which 
may be carried by means of such new technological conduits. 
Thus, in the case of copyright, the incentives entailed in inventing 
around are asymmetric: a given copyright holder is seldom in a race to 
develop the new delivery technology at issue, or for that matter any other 
technology. The development of peer-to-peer systems or Internet streaming 
services does not entail races between different copyright holders to obtain 
exclusive rights. Copyright inventing around, as described above, takes 
 
53 See generally Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Related 
Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317 (2005). 
54 Indeed, Joseph Fishman has begun examining this type of activity under exactly this rubric. See 
Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333 (2015). 
55 See generally Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for a Sound Conception of Copyright’s Derivative 
Work Right, 101 GEO. L.J. 1505 (2013). 
56 See Burk, supra note 22, at 109–10 (noting that copyrighted works are not defined by claims, as 
patented inventions are). 
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advantage of the technology specificity of the copyright statute: innovators 
design new technologies to avoid infringing the statutory rights tied to 
older technologies. The copyright holder, on the other hand, will tend to be 
invested in the existing technology that falls within the rights defined by 
the statute or may possibly stand to benefit from extension of his rights to 
new technologies similarly falling within the statutory ambit. In fact, the 
copyright holder often has little incentive to develop or encourage 
development of technologies outside those limits. 
This results in what might be termed secondary racing: unlike the 
paradigm in patent racing, the race in copyright is not a race for the 
exclusive intellectual property right. Rather, innovators are racing against 
either the established copying and distribution technologies or against the 
technologies that might be preferred, endorsed, and licensed by copyright 
holders. What this shares with patent racing is the potential for copyright 
inventing around to be socially wasteful by channeling inventive effort 
toward new methods of reproduction or distribution when adequate 
methods are already available. This was in essence Judge Chin’s complaint 
in Aereo.57 But this is not the consequence of an individual grant of 
exclusive rights over copyrighted content. It is rather an ancillary effect of 
exclusivity that a content developer has been granted over technological 
conduits, either directly by virtue of statutory rights defined in terms of 
technology, or indirectly by virtue of secondary liability doctrines. 
Consequently, to the extent that inventing around in copyright 
constitutes a bargaining breakdown, it is not the type of breakdown 
identified above in the patent context. Copyright holders and innovators do 
not have different valuations of the cost of licensing the existing 
intellectual property as against the cost of developing alternative 
intellectual property, as might be the case in patent inventing around. The 
question for the competitor in copyright inventing around is not whether to 
invest in a substitute movie or musical composition. Any disparity in 
valuation is rather more a comparison of apples to oranges; that is, 
comparing the cost of licensing the intellectual property versus developing 
an alternative technological delivery system. 
This asymmetry between the alternatives becomes starker on closer 
examination. Because the alternative to inventing around in copyright is not 
the development of an alternative creative work, the licensing possibility 
involves the collective action problem of licensing the rights against 
secondary liability held by all copyright owners whose works might be 
infringed by the delivery under the current technology. As mentioned 
above, any given copyright holder has little incentive to develop or 
encourage development of technologies outside those limits, making 
 
57 See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. 
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holdouts likely. This combination of asymmetric incentives is therefore 
likely to make the redesign or inventing around option highly attractive to 
the secondary racer. 
The question then is whether this incentive is socially perverse. We 
have said that copyright inventing around may be socially wasteful for 
channeling inventive effort toward new methods of reproduction or 
distribution when adequate methods are already available. The social 
desirability of such inventing around depends upon whether Judge Chin’s 
assertions are correct—whether, for example, designing a technological 
alternative to public performance using scores of dime-sized antennae is an 
inefficient design intended only to circumvent some legal language or 
whether it may instead constitute a useful innovation. In some cases, the 
latter may prove true; for example, the peer-to-peer architectures developed 
in the wake of the Napster ruling may be useful for some applications and 
society is better off possessing the technology. At the time of this writing, 
Netflix appears to be considering such peer-to-peer systems as a better way 
to deliver authorized video content.58 Such systems would not have been 
developed by copyright holders, and if they are socially valuable it is 
unclear why their development should not be promoted via inventing 
around. 
CONCLUSION 
In general, we do not think of copyright as a regime intended to foster 
technological innovation.59 However, despite copyright’s ostensible 
orientation toward promoting creative works by securing exclusive rights to 
authors, copyright appears to also have a somewhat hidden hand in 
fostering or shaping certain technological progress. By siting the exclusive 
rights of copyright in technical actions, copyright law routinely promotes 
inventing around, paralleling the more familiar inventing around doctrine 
in patent law. But copyright inventing around is concerned with global 
solutions for actions such as reproduction or distribution, directed to classes 
of creative works rather than to particular creative works. 
This fosters an asymmetry in the incentives of copyright holders and 
technical innovators, which may frame a more compelling policy argument 
for inventing around in copyright than is found in patent inventing around. 
Indeed, in its recent Aereo decision, the Supreme Court, while rejecting the 
 
58 Jon Brodkin, Netflix Researching “Large-Scale Peer-to-Peer Technology” for Streaming, ARS 
TECHNICA (Apr. 25, 2014, 3:45 PM), http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/04/netflix-
researching-large-scale-peer-to-peer-technology-for-streaming/ [http://perma.cc/4XLV-MVGE]. 
59 With of course the possible exception—the exception that proves the rule—of computer 
software, which remains problematic within the copyright regime precisely because it is technical rather 
than artistic subject matter. See Dan L. Burk, Method and Madness in Copyright Law, 2007 UTAH L. 
REV. 587, 613–14. 
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particular design strategy adopted by the Aereo system, essentially invited 
or suggested other system designs that it hinted might pass legal muster.60 If 
copyright is either unwittingly or explicitly shaping such technological 
endeavors, this effect requires closer consideration and more nuanced 
recognition, either as a policy goal or as a policy by-product, than Congress 
or the courts have granted it to date. 
  
 
60 See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2510–11 (2014). 
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